STUDY PROJECT

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MAY 1982

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BATTALION PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION CENTER

A GROUP STUDY

by

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Since the implementation of the Personnel Administration Center (PAC) concept at battalion level in 1976, there has been considerable debate with regard to its effectiveness and its impact on battalion units. Several Army major commands have conducted studies concerning PAC effectiveness, but no major revisions of the system have resulted. Nevertheless, the debate on the PAC performance continues. This study reviews previous PAC studies and gives an extensive analysis of current data collected by survey of 374

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at battalion and company level. The study sample included 141 current or
former commanders of PAC-supported battalions. The paper concludes that
significant administrative workload still exists at company level even though
the PAC has shifted much of that workload to battalion, and that the PAC has
not freed company commanders and first sergeants to participate in training
to the extent envisioned at implementation. The study also found that
the number of people working on personnel and administrative tasks within the
battalion has increased and that nearly all company-size units have shadow
clerks. Finally, it concludes that the PAC, notwithstanding its shortcomings,
is a viable concept. It recommends that the PAC concept be retained and that
a clerk be authorized at company level to correct its most significant
weakness.

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EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BATTALION PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION CENTER

A GROUP STUDY PROJECT

by

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PREFACE

This Group Study Project was conducted under the sponsorship of the US Army War College (USAWC) Military Studies Program. The research topic and general scope of the study were provided by the Office of The Inspector General, Department of the Army (DAIG). The authors, all members of the USAWC Class of 1982, selected the study because of their past experience in personnel and administrative systems and programs management, and because of their concern for improving the basic Army element dedicated to these people-oriented functions. The group's plan for conducting the research and analysis for the study project was designed primarily to address the concerns expressed by the DAIG in the research topic submitted to the USAWC.

There were many people throughout the Army who extended invaluable help in the study efforts. Completion of the study would have been impossible without their assistance. A special thanks goes to other members of the USAWC Class of 1982 who spent so much time completing the survey forms and discussing the Battalion Personnel Administration Center with the Study Group. Also, many Battalion Commanders, Company Commanders, Command Sergeants Major, First Sergeants, and PAC NCOs in the field took time to share their views. Finally, the guidance, patience, help and understanding of the USAWC staff and faculty were extremely helpful throughout this project.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

In 1976, the Chief of Staff of the Army approved the Personnel Administration Center (PAC) concept for worldwide implementation. The primary intent of this change was to improve efficiency by centralizing personnel administration at battalion level and to free the company commanders and first sergeants from their routine personnel administration responsibilities so they could concentrate on training and readiness. Since the implementation of PAC, there has been considerable debate as to how well it has worked and its possible negative impact on the companies and the battalion as a whole. Six major studies have been conducted concerning various aspects of PAC organization, doctrine, and performance. Numerous recommendations have been made for changes to the concept. Many of these changes have been implemented but some of the more significant ones have not been approved because of the perceived manpower cost. There are many key personnel who feel that significant fixes are necessary if the PAC is to remain a viable concept. There are others who are convinced that the PAC has proven through its performance that it is not effective and that it should go the route of other discontinued centralization concepts of the Consolidation of Administration at Battalion Level (CABL) program such as the Maintenance Administration Center (MAC), the Supply Administration Center (SAC), and the Dining Facility Administration Center (DFAC). Also, there are many people who feel the PAC concept is good and requires only some minor changes and good leadership to do the job. Thus the debate in the field goes on with some strong views on both sides of the issue.

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THE STUDY GROUP

The study was conducted by three members of the USAWC Class of 1982. As students operating in an academic environment, they did not represent any major command nor did they have any pressure to support or refute prior study findings or to reach any specific conclusions. All had considerable experience and background with the PAC system, to include command of battalions which not only had a PAC, but which were also significantly dependent upon interface with other PAC-supported battalions for mission accomplishment. Additionally, each had served as the Adjutant General of a combat division and had been functionally involved with the PAC system since its implementation. None had worked on the development of the PAC concept; neither had they participated in any prior studies related to the PAC.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The general purpose of the study, as defined by the DA Inspector General (DAIG), was to determine whether centralization of personnel administration at battalion level has eliminated the requirement for a company clerk an' improved administrative efficiency.

OBJECTIVES

The four overall objectives of the study were:

- To determine if the PAC has caused any shifts in the personnel administrative workload within the battalion.

- To determine if the PAC concept has resulted in more or less people being dedicated to working on personnel administration tasks within the battalion.

- To determine if the PAC concept has accomplished its stated purpose of improving efficiency and freeing company commanders and first sergeants so they can concentrate their efforts on training and readiness.

- To determine the net impact the PAC has had at the company level.

ASSUMPTIONS

Four critical assumptions were considered appropriate:

- That the original intent and purpose of the PAC remain valid.

- That viable solutions to PAC problems will be implemented even if additional resources are required.

- That consideration will be given to major modifications or discontinuance of the concept if it is shown that the PAC concept is not working.

- That there has been a general increase in administrative requirements throughout the Army in the last several years because of the way we do business.

SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH

The research requirements, as established by the DAIG (see Appendix 1), were to:

- Evaluate the impact of the battalion PAC on distribution of the administrative workload within the battalion.

- Determine if the administration center concept has resulted in more people dedicated to the task of administration.

- Determine the administrative impact at company level.

The Study Group did not find any historical data on personnel administration workload or numbers of people involved in that function at battalion level

prior to PAC implementation. Background information revealed that a notional

battalion was used during the PAC decision process to illustrate its organiza-

tion and sources of manpower spaces. This absence of meaningful baseline data

precludes any objective evaluation of the impact of the PAC concept on workload,

manpower requirements, or company-level units. Further, Army-wide changes in

personnel administration requirements during the seven years since the PAC

system was fielded have surely impacted on workload and would thereby distort

any conclusions with regard to PAC impact unless such variables could be iso-

lated and accurately measured. Consequently, the findings of this study with

regard to the DAIG research requirements must be based on the opinions expressed

by the survey and interview respondents. However, the credibility of both

the sample and the Study Group members, as previously discussed, should lend

considerable significance to the study findings.

In addition to analysis of the frequency distribution of the various

responses to the survey questions, cross-tabulations were done to determine

whether significant correlations existed among responses to various questions.

Further, responses by individuals who held various duty positions were

examined and comparisons were done between CONUS and OCONUS data; between

data from TOE versus TDA units; and among combat, combat support, and combat

service support battalions. Where significant differences existed, they are

included in the discussion of the relevant data (Chapter III). Absence of a

comment in the discussion indicates that there were no meaningful differences

noted.

Finally, the study was expanded beyond the three specific impact issues

designated by the DAIG. The Study Group also gathered data on PAC effective-

ness, staffing (to include company shadow clerks), and the viability of the

PAC concept. Other factors such as command and control, wartime doctrine,

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equipment (other than briefly), training, organization, and procedures were
not specifically included in this study effort as they are adequately
addressed in other current research reports.

METHODOLOGY

The research plan for this study was developed to gather and analyze
historical and current data with regard both to staffing for the personnel
administration function in the battalion and to PAC performance. The plan
consisted of three major parts: a literature analysis, a written survey of
selected officers and NCOs, and direct discussions with individuals or small
groups of officers and NCOs in the field who had recent experience with, or
were currently working with, the PAC concept. Care was taken to insure that
appropriate grades and positions, as well as different types of commands and
geographic locations, were represented.

The literature analysis consisted of a review of data related to the
development of the PAC concept and subsequent PAC studies. The purpose of
the background review was to determine the rationale behind establishment
of the PAC and the rationale that supported its development and implementa-
tion. The analysis of major PAC studies was done to determine the signifi-
cant problems previously identified and to establish whether there were any
common trends or findings among the studies.

The written survey portion of the research plan was developed to gather
Army-wide data on PAC performance and manning from a cross section of key
personnel. The survey was given to a total of 374 personnel serving at
US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM); US Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC); US Army, Europe (USAREUR); and the USAWC. These individuals
had direct current or previous experience with the PAC. The 150 officers

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eurveyed from the USAWC included 115 former battalion commanders and 35 former brigade or higher level staff officers; they represented almost every major command in the Army. These data were catalogued and examined through computer analysis to determine major differences between types of units and unit geographical locations, and to determine differences in views expressed by key personnel occupying various duty positions while associated with the PAC. This data was also compared with earlier studies to determine whether any significant trends were evident.

Individual and small group interviews and discussions were conducted at FORSCOM, TRADOC, USAREUR, and the USAWC. The purpose of these was to obtain information that might not have been clearly expressed as part of the written survey and to provide the opportunity to verbalize concerns not addressed in the questionnaire. Also, these discussions were used for some direct questioning and examination of problem areas identified in written comments on the survey form. Every effort was made to insure that the discussions allowed for a free exchange of information on a nonattribution basis. Many of the interviews and discussions were held with officers and NCOs who were in a student status, since it was felt that an academic environment was more conducive to open discussion. Information thus gathered was cross-tabulated and correlated with data developed by the written survey.

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CHAPTER II

PRIOR STUDIES

During the period 1975 to 1982, several significant PAC studies were conducted by different commands throughout the Army. Although these studies were conducted for various purposes, almost all of them addressed one or more issues related to the scope of this study project.

MASSTER TEST

The first PAC related study considered was the Modern Army Selected System Test Evaluation and Review (MASSTER) Test of CABL done at Fort Hood, Texas from 29 September 1975 to 26 February 1976 under the direction of the US Army Administration Center (now Soldier Support Center). The major purpose of this study was to evaluate the feasibility of the consolidation of company and battalion administration at battalion level and the feasibility of using word processing techniques for administrative functions at battalion level. The major conclusion and recommendation of this study was that administration should be consolidated at battalion. This led to the establishment of the PAC, MAC, SAC, and DFAC in battalions throughout the Army. There were also several conclusions reached in the MASSTER study that pointed to some of the problems that exist with the PAC today. Evidence showed that the time which company commanders and executive officers spent on formal administration during duty hours was not reduced by the PAC. This was likely an early indication that there were some administrative tasks that inherently belonged at company level. There was also an indication that company commanders felt that the consolidation at battalion had not materially affected the time available for them to supervise training and other critical mission functions,

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a point which is clearly made by company commanders and first sergeants today. Concern also surfaced from company commanders and first sergeants about their loss of prerogatives in running their companies and dealing with their people. Again, this is an area that is frequently cited now by company leadership as a criticism of the PAC concept. Finally, the study made a firm recommendation that word processing equipment and procedures be investigated for possible implementation at battalion level. This effort never really got off the ground as a centralized project. Many PAC now have word processing but they got it on a piecemeal basis, with the ability to obtain funds in the local command being the key. There is now a wide range of equipment types and almost no standard procedures for using the word processing in the PAC. There is, however, at least one combat division which is developing its own standard word processing system and procedures.

USAREUR STUDY

Another evaluation of the PAC was undertaken by USAREUR in 1978 after implementation of the PAC. This study looked at the administrative require-ments that were flowing down to the company and made some recommendations for addressing these issues. They found that the overriding concern with the PAC concept dealt with typing support and that the battalion centralized typing pool was not adequate to handle priority typing in a timely fashion. It was also determined that sensitive correspondence was best accomplished at company level in order to avoid possible embarrassment to the service member concerned. To handle these tasks, they recommended that one Administrative Specialist position (E5, MOS 7IL) be established in each company and that each orderly room be authorized a typewriter. The study

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also found that each orderly room already had one or two shadow clerks and at least one typewriter. The unit commanders and first sergeants surveyed agreed that the PAC had been successful and relieved the unit of a large amount of administrative tasks, but there was a significant amount of administrative work remaining at company level. They cited such things as posting bulletin boards, privately owned vehicle (POV) reports, answering telephones, unit readiness reports, mail control, distribution control, drafting letters, and numerous other housekeeping functions. Also, they indicated that the company clerk was often responsible for a variety of additional duties such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operation, Nuclear-Biological-Chemical, training, and reenlistment. Finally, they reported that the company clerk was a very select individual who was utilized as an assistant to the first sergeant and commander. Because of this role and his quality, the clerk actually helped relieve the company commander and first sergeant of orderly room duties so they could concentrate on other missions such as training. Our current survey data supports almost every 1978 USAREUR finding, except the one that indicated that concern for typing support was the overriding factor in regard to the PAC.

IG FINDINGS

During this same time frame, there were numerous IG findings with regard to the PAC. These findings, seemingly stripped of any special bias, appeared to hit a little more directly at some of the PAC problems. A compendium of IG findings from FORSCOM, TRADOC, and USAREUR cited in the US Army Administration Center, Personnel Administration Center Evaluation, 30 April 1979. highlighted the following:

1. PAC caused a decrease in responsiveness to companies.

2. PAC was used as a typing pool for other staff elements.

3. Company and battery-size units were forced to use shadow clerks.

4. One infantry division had authorized each company to divert one soldier to clerk functions on a 90-day rotational basis.

5. There was a critical shortage of qualified PAC personnel.

6. Equipment authorizations for the PAC were unrealistic and inadequate.

7. PAC did not significantly reduce administrative workload a company level.

8. Universally, more administrative personnel were utilized than prior to PAC.

9. Company commanders and first sergeants were not freed from other administrative requirements.

10. First sergeants were effectively removed from their traditional role of assisting their soldiers with pay and administrative matters.

11. In FORSCOM, the PAC failed to promote efficiency, required additional personnel, decreased responsiveness, and did not contribute directly to combat readiness.

Again, as was the case with the MASSTER and USAREUR PAC studies, reviewing these findings was very much like looking at the current survey data from key personnel in the field, particularly with regard to PAC performance and staffing. One could easily draw the conclusion that several studies of PAC in the last few years have hit the mark in identifying problems. However, because studies continue to report similar problems over time, it appears that corrective actions are either inappropriate or, sadly, not undertaken.

FORSCOM STUDY

A study that runs somewhat contrary to several of the IG report findings and the MASSTER and USAREUR conclusions was conducted by FORSCOM in 1977. The significant conclusions that were different from those found in the other studies were:

1. No clerks were needed at the company level if a telephone answering service was provided.

2. The excessive administrative burden on the PAC was caused by the failure of their own higher headquarters to realize the impact of local directives, policies, and procedures.

3. Unrealistic and unnecessary reporting requirements had been imposed by higher headquarters.

4. An overall failure to develop and use simplified procedures for accomplishing administrative tasks.

5. There were sufficient personnel authorized to do the PAC mission.

6. The use of PAC personnel for details placed no more of a burden on the PAC than on any other organizational element.

Notwithstanding the fact that this study seemed to strongly support the PAC concept, it did recognize that the TOE did not authorize enough equipment for PAC operations and that utilization of word processing would increase PAC productivity and responsiveness. It also indicated that dedicated copier machine support would increase PAC effectiveness. The frequent rotation of adjutants was also cited as having a serious adverse impact on PAC operations.

ADMINISTRATION CENTER (ADMINCEN) STUDY

The most thorough and significant of all PAC studies to date was conducted by the US Army Administration Center (now Soldier Support Center) in

1979. This effort considered all the major studies cited above plus

several smaller ones. A field survey was conducted, visits to field

locations were made to conduct on-site observation of conditions, and

representatives of interested agencies of FORSCOM, TRADOC and USAREUR

were consulted. The recommendations in that study were direct and dealt

specifically with the more significant problems identified. It stated

that it was clear that, now and in the future, some administration simply

could not be effectively consolidated above unit level. It also stated

that the Army had never fully recognized the magnitude of efforts required

at the first level of personnel and administration, nor had it been in the

past willing to resource and support those functions at that level. The

study contended that the soldier had not been hurt because the commander

and first sergeant had provided the support on an ad hoc basis, but the

cost has been to diminish training. It pointed out that unless we were

willing to pay the price for this grass roots support, we would have to

settle for what we have today--mediocrity. Finally, the study indicated

that workload drives the train and that in the real world the workload is

not going to diminish. The final conclusions and recommendations of the

study were in line with the above comments and certainly were made with the

understanding that they would face rough water when they were considered by

those who control distribution of the Army's resources. The conclusions were:

1. PAC do repetitive things like SIDPERS & Finance well, but do

soldier support and service functions less well.

2. Much administration is still done at company level by shadow clerks.

3. PAC has not changed personnel and administration workload at

company and battalion levels.

4. There is a need for doctrine on tactical employment.

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5. Personnel and equipment fixes are needed.

The key recommendations were:

1. Publish written doctrine on the tactical employment of the PAC.

2. Convert the PSNCO to a mail and distribution clerk.

3. Exploit word processing as a means of dealing with the heavy peacetime typing requirement.

4. Upgrade the entry standards for MOS 71L (Administrative Specialist) and 75B (Personnel Administration Specialist).

5. Examine the MOS mix within the PAC to determine if the proper mix of MOS 71L and 75B is present to accomplish actual workload.

6. Impose positive control over utilization of MOS 71L and 75B personnel in elements above battalion, and give battalion commanders some control over award and withdrawal of MOS 75B.

7. Upgrade the entry standards for MOS 71L and 75B.

8. Recognize and authorize one MOS 75B in each company served by a PAC.
Of the eight recommendations, three were key to addressing the critical problems with the PAC. They were the recommendations to upgrade entry requirements for MOS 71L and 75B, to exploit the use of word processing, and to authorize one 75B clerk in each company served by a PAC. As was the case with previous PAC studies which recommended addition of the company clerk, the resources required (approximately 868 personnel spaces) was the overriding consideration which precluded approval by TRADOC. The Administration Center was asked to do an assessment of three alternative solutions:

- Alternative 1. Implement the recommended solutions. Scale down PAC size and put one clerk in each PAC-supported company. Identify the source for the 868 personnel spaces and fix other shortcomings.

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- Alternative 2. Eliminate the PAC entirely. Put the clerks back in the companies and identify personnel costs.

- Alternative 3. Leave the PAC as it is today. Fix administrative and equipment shortcomings.

Since it was clear that no additional personnel spaces would be supported by TRADOC, the Administration Center's solution to the long-standing, previously documented significant weakness of the PAC system was potentially limited to a purely cosmetic solution.

1ST PERSONNEL COMMAND (PERSCOM) STUDY

The most recent study of the PAC was conducted by the 1st PERSCOM, USAREUR, in late 1981. The study consisted primarily of a field survey of battalion commanders, command sergeants major, company commanders, and first sergeants. A total of 131 personnel representing 19 battalions were surveyed. The breakdown of personnel by position was:

        10 Battalion Commanders
        11 Command Sergeants Major
        58 Company Commanders
        52 First Sergeants

The major conclusions drawn from the field survey data were:

1. Commanders support the retention of the PAC program, but feel it should be modified. Complex functions should stay with the PAC (e.g., SIDPERS) and simple administrative tasks should be done at unit level.

2. Company and battalion commanders feel that the PAC:

    a. Effectively supports the battalion headquarters and the companies.

    b. Reduces the time devoted to administration by company commanders and first sergeants.

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c. Does not improve training and readiness as much as was originally expected when the concept was developed.

d. Improves support to the soldier.

3. The Battalion S-1 position turns over rapidly, and most incumbents do not intend to pursue an administrative speciality as their additional specialty.

4. The training given to PAC personnel during Advanced Individual Training (AIT) is not adequate. Soldiers need more training in SIDPERS, promotion procedures, and filing.

5. A large number of soldiers are being diverted from their primary job to work as unauthorized unit clerks.

6. The battalion leadership feels that the PAC is understaffed by at least two authorizations.

Although the sample size of the 1st PERSCOM study was relatively small in comparison to our field survey of 374 key people associated with the PAC (including 141 battalion commanders), the findings were just about the same.

Based on the conclusions drawn from the survey data, 1st PERSCOM recommended to HQ USAREUR that the following actions be taken to help commanders increase the effectiveness of the PAC and to ultimately conserve manpower:

1. Validate, through manpower survey, the actual manpower needs at PAC and unit level; use the results as the basis for a long-term Program Analysis and Resource Review (PARR) issue.

2. As an interim measure, authorize commanders to divert soldiers to meet the need for a unit clerk in each unit with prescribed ground rules as to who it can be.

3. Advise Soldier Support Center of the need for more specific training on SIDPERS, promotion, and filing procedures.

4. Encourage commanders to stabilize officers assigned to S-1 positions for 12 months.

The basic thrust of these proposals was approved by HQ USAREUR and actions are ongoing to implement them. It is too early to predict the exact outcome of these actions, but there is a strong likelihood that HQ USAREUR will give final approval to the plan to permit each company to divert one soldier to clerk duty. The proposal, of course, calls for a number of restrictions as to the type of soldier that the companies could use in this clerk position. For example, a first-term soldier who is bonus recipient could not be used, and time and opportunity must be provided for the soldier to maintain proficiency in his/her primary military occupational specialty (PMOS). The official approval for a clerk in the companies recognizes what is already taking place in about 90% of the companies. In fact, one USAREUR combat division had already authorized its companies to assign one soldier to special duty as the company clerk. The division commander directed restrictions similar to those proposed by 1st PERSCOM in selecting soldiers for the clerk position and tasked the Division Adjutant General to develop an on-the-job training (OJT) program for these personnel. The 1st PERSCOM has decided that it is highly unlikely that we will ever stop commanders from switching their S-1 every few months and that the best approach to the problem is to attempt to train the personnel that the battalion commander places in the S-1 position. They are currently staffing a proposal that would provide a two or three-day course to be conducted by 1st PERSCOM in USAREUR for newly assigned S-1s.

OTHER STUDIES

There have been several other studies that have addressed PAC issues in a less comprehensive manner than the six major studies previously cited in this paper. Nevertheless, many of them have addressed some key problems that have direct bearing on this study project. Appendix 2 is a brief summary of these other studies.

CHAPTER III

SURVEY ANALYSIS

THE INSTRUMENT

The survey instrument used for this study was a questionnaire with 27
multiple choice questions. It included questions specifically about the
PAC with which the respondent was most recently associated as well as
questions with regard to the PAC concept in general. Before being admin-
istered on a broad basis, it was pretested on a sample audience at the US
Army War College, then revised to modify or add questions and response
choices relevant to matters surfaced by the test sample. A copy of the
questionnaire annotated with the frequency distribution of responses is at
Appendix 3.

THE SAMPLE

The questionnaire was administered to students, staff, and faculty at
the Army War College; and to key personnel currently assigned to duty
positions with PAC-related responsibilities in FORSCOM, TRADOC and USAREUR.
All respondents completed the same survey form regardless of the position
held. A total of 374 personnel were surveyed who represented a wide
variety of duty positions in many different types of units both in CONUS
and overseas. Follow-up interviews were conducted with 163 key personnel
assigned to units in the field. The results of those interviews and comments
written on the survey answer sheets are discussed in Chapter IV. The dis-
tribution of survey respondents by duty position, PAC location, and type
of unit is shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3. (The totals columns and rows may

not always add to 374 because some responses on the coded answer form were wild (out of range) or some respondents elected not to answer selected questions. The percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding.)

The largest grouping of respondents was battalion commanders (141 of 374), about 38% of the sample. Most of these (115) were Army War College students who had recent battalion command assignments. The other 26 battalion commanders were currently serving in such positions. If selection for battalion command and senior service college attendance are credible measures of success, then considerable weight must be given to the views and opinions expressed by this group. Note also that 36 company commanders, 22 command sergeants major, and 36 first sergeants were also included in the sample. When combined with battalion commanders, 63% of the survey results are thus attributable to key leaders at the level at which the PAC operates--those who have the primary responsibility for taking care of soldiers and/or insuring that they are taken care of. The views of other respondents must also be considered relevant as they directly supervise PAC operations (Adjutants, PAC Supervisors, and Personnel Staff NCO), have direct interface with the PAC in their functional responsibilities (brigade and division staff officers), or are dependent upon the PAC for individual personnel support though not responsible for its operation (other staff officers). Finally, one must recognize that many of the company commanders included in the survey probably did not experience the personnel support system in effect prior to PAC implementation, and thus their judgments with regard to comparisons of the former company clerk/S-1 section personnel support system and the current PAC system must be weighed in that light.

SURVEY RESPONDENTS
(Position-Type Unit)

Position	Combat	Combat Spt TOE	Combat Spt TDA	Service Spt TOE	Service Spt TDA	Other	Totals
Battalion Commander	73	27	9	19	9	4	141
Company Commander	9	13	2	8	2	2	36
Command Sergeant Major	11	4	0	6	1	0	22
First Sergeant	11	12	1	5	2	5	36
PAC Supervisor	18	6	0	2	3	1	30
Personnel Staff NCO	4	4	1	3	2	1	15
Other	23	13	7	21	15	11	90
Totals	149	79	20	64	34	24	370

Table 1

SURVEY RESPONDENTS
(Position-Location)

Position	CONUS	OCONUS	Totals
Battalion Commander	92	48	140
Company Commander	24	12	36
Command Sergeant Major	13	8	21
First Sergeant	27	9	36
PAC Supervisor	12	15	27
Personnel Staff NCO	9	6	15
Other	46	42	88
Totals	223	140	363

Table 2

SURVEY RESPONDENTS
(Type Unit-Location)

Type Unit	CONUS	OCONUS	Totals
Combat	87	60	147
Combat Support TOE	45	33	78
Combat Support TDA	13	7	20
Service Support TOE	32	30	62
Service Support TDA	25	8	33
Other	20	2	22
Totals	222	140	362

Table 3

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NONATTRIBUTION

The survey respondents were identified on the questionnaire by duty
position, unit location (CONUS or overseas), and type of unit for the
statistical purposes only. Individual names, unit designation, and major
command affiliation were deliberately not sought by the Study Group. The
purpose of the nonattribution approach was to offset any real or perceived
pressures to provide responses which endorsed a previously determined
command position with regard to the PAC concept and to preclude the tendency
to support earlier study findings. It was also intended to preclude any
inclination to distort, or reluctance to express, true feelings about the
effectiveness of their own PAC operation.

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BATTALION PAC

Overall Effectiveness. Survey respondents were asked to rate the
overall effectiveness of their unit's PAC operation, using a scale of 1
to 5, with 1 being poor and 5 being outstanding. Results are shown in
Tables 4 and 5. By defining a rating of 3 or higher as indicating satis-
faction with the PAC operation, one can conclude that 84% were satisfied.
Ratings of 3-5 rendered by key leaders in CONUS were significantly higher
than those of OCONUS respondents, except for command sergeants major. The
satisfaction of first sergeants was also significantly lower than that of
other key personnel, a factor that was clearly evidenced in their responses
throughout the questionnaire. Thus it can be seen that a convincingly large
proportion of the key personnel are satisfied with their PAC. Interestingly,
51% rated their PAC 4 or 5, indicating that they were more than just
"satisfied."

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SATISFACTION WITH PAC OPERATION
(Position-Location)

Position	CONUS % 3-5	OCONUS % 3-5	Combined % 3-5
Battalion Commander	95	79	89
Company Commander	88	67	81
Command Sergeant Major	83	88	86
First Sergeant	71	38	63
All Respondents	89	77	84

Table 4

EFFECTIVENESS OF PAC OPERATION
(Position-Rating)

Position	Poor 1	2	3	Outstanding 4	5	Average Rating
Battalion Commander	2	14	41	50	33	3.7
Company Commander	4	3	13	13	3	3.2
Command Sergeant Major	0	3	7	10	1	3.4
First Sergeant	4	8	12	5	3	2.8
All Respondents	14	43	119	121	63	3.5

Table 5

Support to the Headquarters, Units, and Individual Soldiers. Findings with regard to the adequacy of PAC support to the battalion headquarters, subordinate units, and individual soldiers are summarized in Table 6.

EFFECTIVENESS OF PAC OPERATION
(Element Supported-Rating)

Element Supported	Poor 1	2	3	Outstanding 4	5	Average Rating
Battalion Headquarters	8	26	98	130	99	3.8
Subordinate Units	24	49	128	113	49	3.3
Individual Soldiers	22	56	103	110	70	3.4

Table 6

Nearly 91% rated support to the battalion headquarters 3 or higher, as opposed to 80% for support to subordinate units and 78% for support to

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individual soldiers. As was the case with the evaluations of overall PAC operations, company leaders rated PAC support to these three levels lower than battalion leaders as can be seen in Table 7. Tables 8, 9 and 10 compare ratings of support to various levels as viewed by individuals who held different duty positions. There were some differences between CONUS (83% satisfied, average rating 3.5) and OCONUS (70% satisfied, average rating of 3.2), and between TOE units (79% satisfied, average rating 3.5) and TDA units (71% satisfied, average rating 3.1) for support to individual soldiers. There were no other notable differences among PAC locations, types of units, or types of unit authorization documents for any of the three levels of support.

SUPPORT TO HQ, UNITS, AND SOLDIERS
(Position-Rating)

Position	Bn HQ % 3-5	Units % 3-5	Indiv % 3-5	Avg PAC Effectiveness Rating
Battalion Commander	94	82	80	3.7
Company Commander	92	72	71	3.2
Command Sergeant Major	86	82	76	3.4
First Sergeant	80	66	63	2.8
All Respondents	91	80	79	3.5

Table 7

SUPPORT TO BATTALION HEADQUARTERS
(Position-Rating)

Position	Poor 1	2	3	Outstanding 4	5	Average Rating
Battalion Commander	0	8	34	60	38	3.9
Company Commander	2	1	8	17	8	3.8
Command Sergeant Major	1	2	4	12	3	3.6
First Sergeant	1	5	11	6	7	3.4
All Respondents	8	26	97	130	99	3.8

Table 8

SUPPORT TO SUBORDINATE UNITS
(Position-Rating)

Position	Poor 1	2	3	Outstanding 4	5	Average Rating
Battalion Commander	6	19	53	46	16	3.3
Company Commander	4	16	11	15	0	3.6
Command Sergeant Major	3	1	7	9	2	3.3
First Sergeant	4	7	12	7	2	2.9
All Respondents	24	48	128	113	49	3.3

Table 9

SUPPORT TO INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS
(Position-Rating)

Position	Poor 1	2	3	Outstanding 4	5	Average
Battalion Commander	5	24	36	48	28	3.5
Company Commander	3	7	11	13	1	3.1
Command Sergeant Major	1	4	6	7	3	3.3
First Sergeant	5	7	9	9	2	2.9
All Respondents	22	55	110	110	70	3.4

Table 10

Matrices showing comparisons among ratings of support to these three levels and with overall PAC effectiveness established clearly that as PAC effectiveness increased, so did the perceived quality of support to each of the three elements. Further, the higher ratings of support to one element were paralleled by higher ratings of support to each of the others. The indication was clear that the overall evaluation of PAC effectiveness was based on the broad spectrum of support requirements rather than that given to a specific level.

Technical Expertise of PAC Personnel. Respondents were also asked to rate the technical expertise (MOS proficiency) of their PAC personnel. About 72% rendered ratings of 3 or higher, including 36% who indicated their personnel were above average (ratings of 4 or 5) as shown in Table 11. This

result is not inconsistent with written and verbal comments received by the Study Group (discussed in Chapter IV) which indicated poor quality of PAC personnel on arrival in the unit. The questionnaire ratings are presumed to apply to operating personnel as opposed to replacements.

TECHNICAL EXPERTISE OF PAC PERSONNEL
(Position-Rating)

Position	Poor 1	2	3	Outstanding 4	5	Average
Battalion Commander	7	34	47	38	13	3.1
Company Commander	2	8	17	5	2	2.9
Command Sergeant Major	2	2	10	4	4	3.3
First Sergeant	7	4	11	7	2	2.8
All Respondents	26	75	131	96	34	3.1

Table 11

Of the CONUS respondents, 74% rated the technical expertise of their PAC personnel satisfactory (3-5) as opposed to 67% for OCONUS responses. As was the case when overall PAC effectiveness was compared with support provided, overall effectiveness ratings increased as technical expertise ratings increased, again with a high level of significance.

Areas of Concern. The last area reviewed as part of overall PAC effectiveness was the one to determine whether quality typing support or adequate administrative support to the companies was more of a concern. Earlier studies have shown that quality typing support was considered more important. Nearly 59% of the respondents said that support to units was more of a problem than was quality typing (27%). Fourteen percent indicated that neither was a problem. Results were generally consistent among all groups of respondents (Table 12) except that only 3% of the company commanders indicated that neither typing nor support was more of a problem.

There were some notable differences in problem areas as viewed by various types of units as displayed in Table 13.

CONCERN FOR QUALITY TYPING vs SUPPORT TO UNITS
(Position-Concern)

Position	Typing	Support	Neither
Battalion Commander	24%	64%	12%
Company Commander	34%	63%	3%
Command Sergeant Major	18%	68%	14%
First Sergeant	22%	64%	14%
All Respondents	27%	59%	14%

Table 12

CONCERN FOR QUALITY TYPING SUPPORT vs SUPPORT TO UNITS
(Unit Type-Concern)

Unit Type	Typing	Support	Neither
Combat	34%	52%	14%
Combat Support	24%	64%	12%
Combat Service Support	17%	69%	13%

Table 13

STAFFING OF THE BATTALION PAC

Adequacy of Authorizations. Over 62% of those surveyed felt that the PAC personnel authorizations were inadequate to effectively accomplish the mission. Some 29% felt that authorizations were adequate and 9% indicated that they did not know. There was even stronger agreement among CONUS respondents (67%) than among OCONUS respondents (55%) that authorizations were inadequate. There was a 23% spread among groupings within the yes and no responses. Data by position held is in Table 14.

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ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS
(Position-Response)

Position	Yes	No	Don't Know
Battalion Commander	31%	67%	1%
Company Commander	8%	64%	28%
Command Sergeant Major	14%	81%	5%
First Sergeant	28%	58%	14%
All Respondents	29%	62%	9%

Table 14

When ratings of overall effectiveness were compared with responses to the question on the adequacy of personnel authorizations, the results were that 29% of those who rated their PAC effectiveness satisfactory (3-5) indicated that the authorizations were adequate. Interestingly, 85% of those who felt that their authorizations were inadequate also rated their PAC effectiveness as satisfactory. This can probably be accounted for by the usual practice of manning the PAC (irrespective of authorized strengths) with the numbers necessary to achieve an adequate level of support.

Additional Personnel Requirements. When asked how many additional personnel should be authorized in order to effectively accomplish the workload, over 76% said that one or more authorizations were required and 58% said that three or more spaces were needed. The average response (including those who indicated that none were required and limiting the number recommended to 6) was 2.8 spaces. The results, by position, were as shown in Table 15.

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ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL REQUIRED
(Position-Number Needed)

Position	None	1	2	3	4	5	6 or more	Average
Battalion Commander	32	3	16	28	24	21	17	3.0
Company Commander	3	1	4	9	7	2	10	3.7
Command Sergeant Major	2	0	3	4	5	4	4	3.7
First Sergeant	8	4	2	8	5	4	5	2.8
All Respondents	88	16	53	74	57	37	45	2.8
	(24%)	(4%)	(14%)	(20%)	(15%)	(10%)	(12%)	

Table 15

The number of additional personnel required was not significantly related to the ratings of PAC effectiveness. The average number of additional personnel required ranged from 2.6 to 2.9 across the PAC effectiveness ratings, again confirming that the responses to the authorizations questions were made without regard to numbers assigned. In response to the question as to where additional personnel authorizations were required, 32% indicated that increases ought to be made in the PAC, 26% said in the companies, and 24% said more people were needed in both the PAC and the companies. Eighteen percent would not authorize any more spaces. The responses, by position, are in Table 16.

WHERE MORE PEOPLE ARE NEEDED
(Position-Level)

Position	PAC	Companies	Both	Neither
Battalion Commander	26%	29%	26%	19%
Company Commander	19%	36%	42%	3%
Command Sergeant Major	46%	23%	23%	9%
First Sergeant	19%	47%	28%	6%
All Respondents	32%	26%	24%	18%

Table 16

Shadow Clerks. Consistent with what has been reported in all prior studies which addressed this issue, over 91% of those surveyed indicated

that there were shadow clerks in their companies, including 62% who said
they were in all units and 30% who indicated they were only in some units.
There were insignificant differences in ratings of PAC effectiveness among
battalions which did or did not have shadow clerks. In fact, 25 of the
29 who had no shadow clerks rated their PAC 3 or higher on the 1-5 scale.
Some 77% said that the presence of shadow clerks was known by higher head-
quarters, including 11% which said that they had been specifically approved
above battalion level. While CONUS units reported that less than 6% had
been approved by higher headquarters, OCONUS battalions said that 19% were
specifically approved. Ninety percent agreed that these clerks were neces-
sary, including 53% who thought they were absolutely essential (see Table 17).

NEED FOR SHADOW CLERKS
(Position-Necessity)

Position	Not Needed	Probably Needed	Absolutely Essential
Battalion Commander	12%	36%	51%
Company Commander	0%	11%	89%
Command Sergeant Major	14%	19%	67%
First Sergeant	6%	25%	69%
All Respondents	10%	37%	53%

Table 17

There was a very clear (and statistically significant) correlation
between ratings given overall PAC effectiveness and the essentiality of
shadow clerks. A high proportion of those who rated their PAC effective-
ness 1 or 2 felt that shadow clerks were absolutely essential (100% and
77%, respectively). Likewise, the highest percentage of those who felt
that shadow clerks were unnecessary rated their PAC 4 or 5 (49% and 24%,
respectively). Equally important is the fact that the attitude with respect

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to whether shadow clerks were necessary is directly related to the extent
to which they existed in subordinate units as shown in Table 18.

NEED FOR SHADOW CLERKS
(Presence-Necessity)

Presence	Absolutely Essential	Probably Needed	Not Needed
All Units Had	149	73	6
Some Units Had	42	54	13
No Units Had	6	10	15

Table 18

IMPACT OF THE BATTALION PAC

Shifts of Workload. One of the primary purposes of the PAC concept
was to shift workload from companies, batteries, and troops to the battalion
level. The data collected in this survey (Table 19) indicates that such
a shift has in fact occurred, although many respondents feel that the impact
has been just the opposite of what was intended (22%), or that there has
been no change in the workload at either level (18-24%).

SHIFT OF WORKLOAD
(Level-Change)

Level	Increase	Decrease	No Change
Battalion	54%	22%	24%
Company	22%	60%	18%

Table 19

Cross-tabulation of overall PAC effectiveness ratings with responses
regarding changes in workload revealed that decreases in company workload
were directly related to increasing ratings of PAC effectiveness. The
relationship at battalion level was not significant. Another significant
difference was that observed between battalion level leaders (commanders

and command sergeants major) and company level leaders (commanders and first sergeants) with respect to the level and direction of workload changes. Table 20 shows that while most battalion leaders felt that workload had increased at their level (58%) and decreased at company level (61%), the company leaders were not as clearly convinced that such a shift had occurred.

SHIFT OF WORKLOAD
(Position-Change)

Position	Battalion Impact			Company Impact		
	Increase	Decrease	No Change	Increase	Decrease	No Change
Battalion Leaders	58%	19%	23%	26%	61%	12%
Company Leaders	41%	32%	26%	27%	44%	30%
All Respondents	54%	22%	24%	22%	61%	18%

Table 20

Time Requirement. The next issue reviewed was to determine whether the PAC concept had reduced the time devoted to personnel administration at company level. Respondents were asked to indicate on a scale of 1-5 their agreement/disagreement that such had occurred. A response of 5 was defined as strong agreement, a response of 1 was defined as strong disagreement, and a 3 was interpreted as being neutral. On that basis, 45% agreed that such a reduction had taken place (responses of 4 or 5), 21% were neutral, and 33% disagreed. The results, by position, are shown in Table 21.

REDUCED TIME AT COMPANY
(Position-Agreement)

Position	Disagree (1-2)	Neutral (3)	Agree (4-5)
Battalion Commander	29%	24%	47%
Company Commander	39%	14%	47%
Command Sergeant Major	57%	10%	33%
First Sergeant	53%	17%	30%
All Respondents	33%	21%	46%

Table 21

There was highly significant relationship between PAC effectiveness ratings and opinions as to whether the PAC had reduced the time required at company level (see Table 22). Clearly, better PAC ratings paralleled strong agreement that company time requirements were reduced.

REDUCED TIME AT COMPANY
(Effectiveness-Agreement)

Effectiveness	Strongly Disagree 1	2	Neutral 3	4	Strongly Agree 5
Poor PAC (1-2)	6%	4%	2%	3%	2%
Satisfactory PAC (3)	5%	8%	9%	7%	4%
Outstanding PAC (4-5)	3%	9%	9%	13%	16%

Table 22

Similarly, as was expected, there was also a statistically significant correlation between agreement with whether the concept had reduced administrative time at company level and the impact on company workload as shown in Table 23.

REDUCED TIME AT COMPANY
(Workload-Agreement)

Workload	Disagree (1-2)	Neutral (3)	Agree (4-5)
Increased	12%	4%	7%
No Change	6%	3%	9%
Decreased	13%	9%	39%

Table 23

People Involved. When asked how the PAC concept had impacted on the number of people working on personnel and administrative tasks within the battalion, nearly 50% felt that the number had increased. Twenty percent said it had decreased, 19% said no change had occurred, and 12% indicated

that they did not know. There was no significant relationship between the responses to the question on numbers of people involved and ratings of PAC effectiveness, impact on battalion headquarters workload, or impact on the workload at company level. Clearly, the increased personnel administrative requirements may well account for this finding.

Administrative Efficiency. Table 24 shows that 45% of the respondents agreed that the PAC concept had improved administrative efficiency in the battalion. Disagreement was expressed by 32% and the remaining 23% were neutral. First sergeants were clearly more reluctant to agree that efficiency had improved. In fact, 30% of them strongly disagreed that there had been any improvement.

IMPROVED BATTALION ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY
(Position-Agreement)

Position	Disagree (1-2)	Neutral (3)	Agree (4-5)
Battalion Commander	30%	24%	47%
Company Commander	22%	33%	44%
Command Sergeant Major	38%	24%	38%
First Sergeant	64%	21%	15%
All Respondents	32%	23%	45%

Table 24

As could be anticipated, there was also a strong, direct relationship between PAC effectiveness ratings and agreement with improved administrative efficiency. As overall effectiveness ratings rose, so did agreement that the PAC had improved the administrative efficiency of the battalion.

Training Time for Unit Leaders. Another basic premise of the PAC concept was that company commanders and first sergeants would have more free time to devote to training. Only 32% felt that company commanders now had more time (Table 25) and less than 23% said that more time was now

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available to first sergeants to get involved in training (Table 26). Of
the company commanders surveyed, 48% disagreed that they now had more time
and 70% of the first sergeants disagreed--50% of them strongly. The OCONUS
respondents were in stronger agreement that the company commander had been
freed than the CONUS respondents (38% and 27% respectively). Differences
among types of units are shown in Table 27.

TRAINING TIME FOR COMPANY COMMANDERS
(Position-Agreement)

Position	Strongly Disagree (1)	(2)	Neutral (3)	(4)	Strongly Agree (5)
Battalion Commander	19%	33%	25%	17%	7%
Company Commander	17%	31%	31%	8%	14%
Command Sergeant Major	38%	24%	19%	0%	19%
First Sergeant	39%	26%	19%	10%	7%
All Respondents	19%	26%	23%	17%	15%

Table 25

TRAINING TIME FOR FIRST SERGEANTS
(Position-Agreement)

Position	Strongly Disagree (1)	(2)	Neutral (3)	(4)	Strongly Agree (5)
Battalion Commander	25%	33%	27%	12%	3%
Company Commander	31%	31%	17%	14%	8%
Command Sergeant Major	40%	20%	25%	5%	10%
First Sergeant	50%	20%	17%	10%	3%
All Respondents	25%	25%	27%	13%	10%

Table 26

TRAINING TIME FOR UNIT LEADERS
(Unit Type-Agreement)

Unit Type	Co Cdr Freed % Agree	1SG Freed % Agree
Combat	36	24
Combat Support	32	28
Combat Service Support	27	18

Table 27

Of those who agreed that unit commanders had more time, 91% rated their PAC satisfactory (3-5). Conversely, 71% of those who disagreed with regard to the company commander's time also had a satisfactory PAC. The data for first sergeant's time was quite similar. Although related, it appears that PAC effectiveness does not necessarily assure more training time for company commanders and first sergeants.

Unit Readiness. No clear indication of whether the PAC has enhanced unit readiness surfaced in the survey results. About 32% felt it had enhanced readiness, 32% were neutral, and 36% disagreed. Among types of battalions, 40% of the combat units agreed as compared to 27% of the combat support and 29% of the combat service support units. Key leader responses were generally evenly proportioned among those categories too, except that only 10% of the first sergeants agreed, 20% were neutral, and 70% disagreed (see Table 28). As in previous comparisons, there was also a strong, positive relationship between PAC effectiveness ratings and agreement that the PAC had helped to enhance readiness.

ENHANCED UNIT READINESS
(Position-Agreement)

Position	Disagree (1-2)	Neutral (3)	Agree (4-5)
Battalion Commander	36%	35%	30%
Company Commander	31%	31%	39%
Command Sergeant Major	35%	45%	20%
First Sergeant	70%	20%	10%
All Respondents	36%	32%	32%

Table 28

Unit Cohesion. As will be shown later in the discussion on interviews and comments received (Chapter IV), the potential for the PAC to detract from unit cohesion does exist. Soldiers whose needs are met and whose problems are solved by their immediate chain of command or in their company level unit are bound to develop a stronger affinity for those leaders and that unit. Cohesion is enhanced by taking care of soldiers at unit level, not by sending them to some other agency or location to get problems resolved. When asked whether they agreed that the PAC concept had detracted from unit cohesion by relieving company commanders of responsibility for routine personnel administration, 34% agreed, 22% were neutral, and 44% disagreed, as shown in Table 29.

DETRACTED FROM UNIT COHESION
(Position-Agreement)

Position	Disagree (1-2)	Neutral (3)	Agree (4-5)
Battalion Commander	45%	19%	36%
Company Commander	45%	22%	33%
Command Sergeant Major	30%	40%	30%
First Sergeant	46%	30%	24%
All Respondents	44%	22%	34%

Table 29

VIABILITY OF THE PAC CONCEPT

Agreement with the Concept. As shown in Table 30, 55% of the respondents agreed with the PAC concept, in general. Thirty percent said they disagreed, and 15% were neutral. There was a strong correlation between those who rated their PAC as satisfactory and those who agreed with the PAC concept. Sixty-one percent of the combat unit respondents agreed, compared to 46% for the combat support units and 59% for combat service support battalions.

AGREEMENT WITH PAC CONCEPT
(Position-Agreement)

Position	Disagree (1-2)	Neutral (3)	Agree (4-5)
Battalion Commander	30%	12%	58%
Company Commander	31%	17%	53%
Command Sergeant Major	40%	20%	40%
First Sergeant	59%	3%	38%
All Respondents	30%	15%	55%

Table 30

The responses of those who agreed with the PAC concept in general were cross-tabulated with their responses to 11 other questions and these results were compared to the same tabulations for those who disagreed with the concept. Regardless of whether they agreed or disagreed with the PAC concept, most responded to the 11 other survey questions as follows:

- Disagreed that the first sergeant has been freed for training.

- Said that company workload has decreased.

- Said that battalion headquarters workload has increased.

- Rated their PAC effectiveness as satisfactory.

- Said that the concept has resulted in more people working on personnel and administrative tasks in the battalion.

- Indicated they would keep the concept throughout the Army and add a company clerk.

Those who agreed with the PAC concept also agreed with the following while those who disagreed with the concept also disagreed with the following:

- Company commanders have been freed to participate in training.

- The PAC concept has reduced the time devoted to personnel administration at company level.

- Unit readiness has been enhanced.

- Battalion administrative efficiency has been improved.

- The PAC has enhanced unit cohesion.

Retention of the Concept. Over 88% of the survey respondents who expressed opinions said they would retain the PAC concept throughout the Army. Of those, 87% indicated that clerks should be authorized at company level and the other 13% would retain the PAC without change, as shown in Table 31. Over 90% of the CONUS respondents would keep the concept as compared to 82% of the OCONUS personnel. Nearly 14% felt strongly enough about this question to express a written opinion rather than select from the choices offered. Those written opinions are incorporated into the summary in Chapter IV.

RETAIN PAC CONCEPT
(Position-Option)

Position	Keep No Change	Keep-Add Company Clerk	Discard
Battalion Commander	11%	76%	13%
Company Commander	6%	82%	12%
Command Sergeant Major	24%	77%	0
First Sergeant	7%	75%	18%
All Respondents	12%	77%	12%

Table 31

As was the procedure for the analysis of responses regarding agreement with the general concept of the PAC, responses to the question of whether the PAC concept should be retained throughout the Army were cross-tabulated with various questions pertaining to its impact and effectiveness. Again, on an absolute frequency distribution basis, those who would retain the PAC and those who would discard the concept responded as follows to questions indicated:

- Rated their PAC effectiveness as satisfactory.

- Agreed that the administrative workload at the company had decreased.

- Felt that company commanders and first sergeants had not been freed so that their efforts could be directed to training.

- Said that the number of personnel working on personnel and administrative tasks within the battalion had increased.

Those who would keep the PAC felt positively toward the following while those who would discard the concept did not:

- Agreed with the PAC concept.

- Time devoted to personnel administration at the company level has been reduced.

- Unit readiness has been enhanced by the PAC.

- Battalion administrative efficiency has been improved.

- The PAC has enhanced unit cohesion.

CHAPTER IV

FIELD INTERVIEWS AND COMMENTS SUMMARY

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Of the 374 Army personnel who completed the survey questionnaire, 173 (47%) voluntarily wrote additional comments on the answer sheet. The comments were of excellent overall quality and must also be considered extremely relevant as they were made by key personnel who had no specific requirement to provide any written input.

Over 189 personnel were interviewed, including 39 battalion commanders. The others were executive officers, company commanders, command sergeants major, first sergeants, adjutants, PAC supervisors, PSNCO, and students. They were interviewed individually or in groups, depending upon their availability. They represented many different types of battalions, including combat (Infantry, Armor, Cavalry, Field Artillery); combat support (Signal, Aviation, Engineer); combat service support (Personnel and Administration, Medical, Maintenance, General Support); and Training (AIT, officer basic, officer advanced). Both TOE and TDA organizations were included. The nonattribution policy, which applied to all participants in the study, was considered key to the excellent response and quality of comments obtained. Another factor unique to this study was that the participants knew that their comments would not be identified with individuals or commands and fed back through their chain of command, a factor which resulted in more honest and candid remarks. The sheer volume of voluntary responses, coupled with their sincere, discerning criticism and praises of the current system, speaks well of the interest, enthusiasm and concern for the PAC concept.

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Personnel from the following commands and agencies provided input during the field survey and interview phase of the study:

US Army Forces Command

- Fort Hood, Texas
  - 1st Cavalry Division
  - 2d Armored Division
  - 6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat)
  - 13th Support Command (Corps)
  - 3d Signal Brigade

- Fort Bragg, North Carolina
  - 82d Airborne Division
  - 1st Support Command (Corps)

US Army Training and Doctrine Command

- US Army Soldier Support Center, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana

- Combined Arms Test Activity, Fort Hood, Texas

United States Army, Europe

- V Corps
- 1st Armored Division
- 3d Armored Division
- 3d Infantry Division
- 8th Infantry Division
- 32d Army Air Defense Command
- 1st Personnel Command
- 7th Signal Brigade

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, HQDA

US Army Military Personnel Center

The questionnaire provided all respondents the opportunity to comment on any question therein or on any other PAC-related subject. The following specific questions were asked in each organization in which field interviews were conducted:

1. What do you like best about the PAC?

2. What do you like least?

3. If you had the authority to change anything, what would it be?

Participants were allowed to provide multiple responses to each question and to comment on matters in addition to the three specific questions (above) or those contained in the survey. The results are summarized below and listed in the sequence (within category) in which most often cited by written comments or interview responses.

PAC STRENGTHS

Responses to the question "What do you like best about the PAC?" and written comments which were interpreted to imply strengths of the PAC system were:

- PAC provides soldiers, commanders, and staff agencies above battalion level with a single point of contact to accomplish personnel and soldier pay matters.

- Standardization and uniformity of work result in a better finished product and more control, especially for routine actions. Career progression for PAC personnel can be managed more effectively.

- PAC establishes administrative responsibility in a single organizational element and provides the necessary leadership to a team of personnel and administrative specialists. If that leadership is strong and technically proficient, and if cross-training occurs, the unit's administration is normally excellent.

- PAC generally frees the company commander to be with his troops. (This, however, is not true for the first sergeant, who is still burdened with administration.)

PAC WEAKNESSES

Responses to the question "What do you like least about PAC?" and written comments alluding to PAC weaknesses were:

- PACs are slow and impersonal and are often referred to as the "faceless they." A soldier's identity with a particular unit suffers greatly. Personnel actions get delayed and company commanders or first sergeants find it difficult to establish priorities. Company-size units often lose control of personnel, i.e., soldiers go to PAC to complete actions without the company officials' knowledge.

- Company shadow clerks are an absolute "must" to take care of the huge administrative workload at company level. Shadow clerks bring their own typewriters to do the work. PAC has not substantially reduced the administrative workload of company commanders and first sergeants, as envisioned.

- PAC personnel are poorly trained in their MOS upon arrival. This problem is compounded by frequent adjutant turnover and the presence of supervisors who have been recently reclassified from other MOS. These factors lead to a situation of the "blind leading the blind."

- PAC soldiers are viewed as an "always available manpower pool" for any detail. Work interruptions are frequent and long-range planning is almost impossible. (Prior to the PAC concept, company clerks were exempted from all details and duty rosters.)

- PAC is doing things not normally envisioned in its authorization for manpower. It is used as a typing pool for the entire battalion staff and as a catchall for miscellaneous actions coming into the battalion. Overall staffing authorizations are clearly inadequate for peacetime, garrison functions.

- Clerk specialization by type of action processed often results in the work not getting done if the specialist is gone, or it promotes an attitude of "That's not my job." Strong leadership, effective cross-training,

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and a personal commitment to individual soldiers and subordinate units by
PAC personnel must be stressed in order to overcome such problems.

- Equipment authorizations, especially for word processing, need to
be more realistic in terms of existing workload requirements.

- PAC, in some cases, removes the first sergeant and other company
leaders from their traditional role of assisting junior soldiers in their
administrative and financial needs. There are now too many "outs" for
the first sergeant: instead of seeing to it that the young solders'
problems are solved and their needs met, the tendency is to send the
soldier to PAC, ACS, Finance, etc. This reduction of the role of company
leaders and the resultant lack of basic knowledge of solutions to soldier
problems adversely reflects on the credibility of their leadership.

REQUIRED CHANGES

Responses to the question "If you had the authority to change anything,
what would it be?" and other written or verbal comments which supported
changes to the PAC system are grouped in order of significance within each
of the following categories:

Personnel Changes

- Immediately authorize a company clerk space in each company. Priority
should go to those companies over a certain strength and to those companies
not located in close proximity to a PAC. (One battalion commander felt
so strongly about the need for company clerks that he would willingly
give up an officer position.)

- Staff the PAC to full MTOE by grade and MOS.

- Make one PAC clerk responsible for all actions for a specific
company rather than having each specialist do certain things for all.
This has merit considering cross-training and wartime needs.

- Add a records clerk (MOS 75D) and a finance specialist (MOS 73C) to the PAC.

- Require PAC clerks to be MOS qualified before arrival in their units.

Other Changes

- Authorize word processing and copiers for each PAC.

- Educate the company and battalion chains of command on PAC functions, so that they can help make it more effective.

- Evaluate the validity of the PAC role for various types of battalions, considering battlefield dispersion, to see if it can realistically operate in a combat environment (i.e., a division engineer battalion having one company attached to each brigade).

- Evaluate the current PAC emphasis on garrison operations. It is saturated with statistical requirements but not adequately staffed for this and many other garrison functions.

- Split the administrative functions between the company and the PAC; for example, keep SIDPERS, awards, finance, and legal actions at the PAC; place routine matters at the company level.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the analysis of the extensive data collected through the
survey instrument and the written field and interview comments received,
the Study Group concluded the following:

Impact on Administrative Workload Distribution

- Workload has increased at battalion level and has decreased at
company level in direct relationship to PAC effectiveness.

- A significant administrative workload exists at company level.

Impact on Numbers of Personnel Dedicated to Administration

- Numbers of personnel working on personnel and administrative tasks
within the battalion has increased, due in part to changes in Army-wide
requirements.

- Even though personnel authorizations are inadequate, personnel
resources have been diverted to insure PAC effectiveness.

- At least three additional personnel authorizations are required
per battalion.

- Nearly all units have shadow clerks, and this fact is known by
higher headquarters.

Impact at Company Level

- Reduction in time devoted to personnel administration is directly
related to PAC effectiveness.

- PAC has not freed company commanders and first sergeants to participate in training to the extent envisioned.

- There is no clear indication that readiness or cohesion have been enhanced or degraded by the PAC.

PAC Effectiveness

- Most PAC are effective overall and provide satisfactory service to the battalion headquarters, subordinate units, and individual soldiers.

- Personnel arriving in units for PAC duties are not qualified in their PMOS, although operating PAC personnel have adequate technical expertise.

- There is no clear consensus that the PAC has improved administrative efficiency in the battalion.

- Word processing equipment will improve overall effectiveness.

Viability of the Concept

- The PAC concept is viable even though more people are involved and company leaders have not been freed to participate in training.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Retain the PAC concept, with modifications.

- Authorize an additional MTOE or TDA position for a clerk at company level.

- Improve the quality and formal training of personnel with PAC PMOS (71L, 75B, and 75Z).

- Study the impact of the Army-wide authorization of word processing equipment at battalion level and the development of standard procedures for its use.

- Evaluate the feasibility of designating the PMOS for the company clerk's position as that common to the type unit to which assigned.

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RESEARCH TOPIC

MID PRIORITY

Topic - Effectiveness of the Battalion Personnel Administration Center

Nature and Origin of the Problem - The intent was that with administration centralized at battalion level the requirement for a company clerk would be curtailed and administrative efficiency would be improved.

Research Requirements:

Evaluate impact of the Battalion Personnel Administration Center on the distribution of the administrative workload within the battalion.

Determine if the administration center concept has resulted in more people dedicated to the task of administration.

Determine the administrative impact at company level.

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Appendix. 1

OTHER RELATED STUDIES

STUDY TITLE	CONDUCTED BY	DATE	CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
Evaluation of the Battalion Administrative Officer (BAO)	TRADOC Combined Arms Test Activity	June 1981	1. 50% of PAC supervisors and PSNCOs assigned were one grade lower than authorized or recent reclassification from combat arms, with only generalized training in administration. 2. About 30% of the soldiers working in the PAC have PMOS other than 71L/75B.
Division Restructuring Study	1st Cavalry Division	August 1979	PAC is a workable concept but does not eliminate the role of the company as an administrative headquarters. Consequently, shadow clerks were necessary and were employed by all units.
Personnel Administration Center (PAC) Operations	Soldier Support Center (Training Development Directorate)	April 1982	1. PAC operates well and battalion commanders want to retain them. 2. Improvements are needed in training PAC personnel. 39% of PAC supervisors were unqualified in terms of experience and training. Another 18% were marginally qualified. 3. Personnel authorizations were considered adequate although PAC personnel routinely worked long hours. 4. All but training battalions reported they had shadow clerks at company level. 5. In almost every case, PAC performed many nonpersonnel functions such as the preparation of surveys and SOPs.

Study of Systems Tools for
Army Personnel Management

Army Research Institute

August 1981

1. The administrative burden on companies and batteries is excessive.

2. Battalion/company commanders and their staffs routinely worked more than 65 hours a week and a disproportionate share of this time is spent on personnel and unit administration.

3. Generally, PAC are manned by untrained personnel.

4. All companies have one or two shadow clerks.

5. Part of the administrative overload in the units can be traced to the requirement of HQ for more and more information to guide doctrine and policy.

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION

Answer the questions by marking an appropriate response to each question on the answer sheet provided. An example is shown below. Please respond to every question and select only one answer for each question.

EXAMPLE

1. **PAC is an acronym for**:

    1. Personnel Armored Car

    2. Personnel Administration Center

    3. Personal Analysis Committee

ANSWER SHEET

	1	2	3

QUESTIONS 1 TO 17 PERTAIN TO THE PAC WHICH SUPPORTED YOUR LAST UNIT.

#/% 1. **What position did you hold during your most recent association with a PAC?**

#/%		
141/37.9	1.	Battalion Commander
36/9.7	2.	Company Commander
18/4 8	3.	Brigade or Division Staff Officer
3/0.8	4.	Corps or Higher Staff Officer
22/5.9	5.	Command Sergeant Major
36/9.7	6.	First Sergeant
30/8.1	7.	PAC Supervisor
15/4.0	8.	PSNCO
71/19.1	9.	Other

2. **Where was your PAC located?**

224/61.5	1.	CONUS
140/38.5	2.	OCONUS

Appendix 3

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#/%		3. What type of unit were you assigned to?
150/40.4	1.	Combat
79/21.3	2.	Combat Support/TOE
20/5.4	3.	Combat Support/TDA
64/17.3	4.	Combat Service Support/TOE
34/9.2	5.	Combat Service Support/TDA
24/6.5	6.	Other

4. How would you rate the overall effectiveness of your unit's PAC operation?

Poor	1	2	3	4	5	Outstanding
#	14	43	120	121	63	
%	3.9	11.9	33.2	33.5	17.5	Average 3.488

5. How well did the PAC support the battalion headquarters?

Poor	1	2	3	4	5	Outstanding
#	8	26	98	130	99	
%	2.2	7.2	27.1	36.0	27.4	Average 3.792

6. How well did the PAC support all the companies/batteries/troops?

Poor	1	2	3	4	5	Outstanding
#	24	49	128	113	49	
%	6.6	13.5	35.3	31.1	13.5	Average 3.314

7. How well did the PAC support the individual soldiers?

Poor	1	2	3	4	5	Outstanding
#	22	56	103	110	70	
%	6.1	15.5	28.5	30.5	19.4	Average 3.416

8. On an average, how do you rate the technical expertise (MOS proficiency) of the PAC personnel?

Poor	1	2	3	4	5	Outstanding
#	26	76	131	96	34	
%	7.2	20.9	36.1	26.4	9.4	Average 3.099

#/%		9. Were personnel AUTHORIZATIONS (not necessarily assigned strengths) adequate to effectively accomplish your PAC's mission?
108/29.1	1.	Yes
231/62.3	2.	No
32/8.6	3.	Do not know

#/%		
	10.	**How many additional personnel should have been authorized to effectively do the workload?**
88/23.7		0. None
16/4.3		1. One
53/14.3		2. Two
74/19.9		3. Three
57/15.4		4. Four
38/10.2		5. Five
45/12.1		6. Six or more

Average - 2.782 (If choice 6 limited to 6)

11. **Where would you authorize the additional personnel?**

118/31.6	1. In the PAC
97/26.0	2. In the companies
90/24.1	3. In the PAC and in the companies
68/18.2	4. Would not authorize more

12. **Did the companies have shadow clerks?**

229/61.9	1. Yes, in all companies
109/29.5	2. Yes, in some companies
32/8.6	3. No, none anywhere

13. **What was the authority for the shadow clerks in the companies?**

40/10.8	1. Approved by higher headquarters (above battalion)
245/65.9	2. Not approved by higher headquarters but the' knew they were there
57/15.3	3. Strictly unauthorized
30/8.1	4. There were no shadow clerks

#/%		
35/9.5	14.	Were the shadow clerks necessary?
		1. Not needed
138/37.3		2. Probably needed
197/53.2		3. Absolutely essential

15. Which of the following concerns was more of a problem with your PAC operations?

100/27.0   1. Quality typing support

218/58.9   2. Adequate administrative support to the companies

52/14.1   3. Neither of the above

16. What impact did the PAC have on the administrative workload at the battalion headquarters?

198/54.0   1. Increased

82/22.3   2. Decreased

87/23.7   3. No change

17. What impact did the PAC have on the administrative workload at the company?

80/21.7   1. Increased

223/60.4   2. Decreased

66/17.9   3. No change

QUESTIONS 18 TO 26 PERTAIN TO THE PAC CONCEPT IN GENERAL.

---

18. Do you agree with the PAC concept to consolidate personnel administration at battalion level?

Strongly Disagree		1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
	#	59	48	52	95	100	
	%	16.7	13.6	14.7	26.8	28.2	

19. Do you agree in general that the PAC concept has reduced the time devoted to personnel administration at the company level?

		1	2	3	4	5	
Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
	#	48	72	77	83	81	
	%	13.3	19.9	21.3	23.0	22.4	

20. Do you agree that the PAC concept has freed company commanders so their efforts can be directed to training?

		1	2	3	4	5	
Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
	#	70	94	82	61	55	
	%	19.3	26.0	22.7	16.9	15.2	

21. Do you agree that the PAC concept has freed company first sergeants so that their efforts can be directed to training?

		1	2	3	4	5	
Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
	#	91	90	97	48	34	
	%	25.3	25.0	26.9	13.3	9.4	

22. Do you agree that the PACs have helped enhance unit readiness?

		1	2	3	4	5	
Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
	#	57	73	113	82	34	
	%	15.9	20.3	31.5	22.8	9.5	

23. Do you agree that the PAC has improved administrative efficiency in the battalion?

		1	2	3	4	5	
Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
	#	38	79	84	107	58	
	%	10.4	21.6	23.0	29.2	15.8	

24. Do you agree that the PAC concept has detracted from unit cohesion by relieving company commanders of responsibility for routine personnel administration?

		1	2	3	4	5	
Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
	#	72	89	80	74	49	
	%	19.8	24.5	22.0	20.3	13.5	

#/% 25. In general, how has the PAC concept impacted on the number of personnel working on personnel and administrative tasks within the battalion?

69/18.5   1. No change

185/49.7   2. Increased

74/19.9   3. Decreased

44/11.8   4. Do not know

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#/%	26. The PAC concept throughout the Army should be
36/9.8	1. Retained without change
236/64.3	2. Retained but clerks should also be authorized at company level
37/10.1	3. Discarded
7/1.9	4. No opinion
51/13.9	5. Opinion expressed on back of answer sheet

27. Written comments concerning the PAC concept and its future in the Army will be appreciated. Please use the back side of the answer sheet to record your comments.

143/44.3	1. Comments provided
180/55.7	2. No comments

THAT'S ALL!! THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND ASSISTANCE.

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